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Abstract
By exploiting two very large samples of US subjective well-being
data we are able to obtain comparable estimates of the monetary
and other costs of unemployment on the unemployed themselves,
while simultaneously estimating the eﬀects of local employment on
the subjective well-being of the rest of the population. For those
who are unemployed, the subjective well-being consequences can be
divided into income and non-income eﬀects, with the latter being ﬁve
times larger than the former. This is similar to what has been found
in many countries, as is our ﬁnding that the non-income eﬀects are
lower for individuals living in areas of high unemployment. Most
importantly, we are able to use the large sample size and variety
of questions in the BRFSS and Gallup daily polls to reconcile, and
extend to the United States, what had previously seemed to be
contradictory results on the size and nature of the spillover eﬀects
of unemployment on subjective well-being. At the population level
the spillover eﬀects are twice as large as the direct eﬀects, making
the total well-being costs of unemployment ﬁfteen times larger than
those directly due to the lower incomes of the unemployed.
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A small literature uses data on subjective well-being to study macroeco-
nomic determinants of life quality and relates them to policy discussions.
Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) uses self-reported life satisfaction
from the Euro-barometer surveys to estimate the unemployment-inﬂation
tradeoﬀ. Wolfers (2003) uses the same source of data to evaluate the cost
of business cycle volatility. Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003) tests
whether European style welfare state policies make life too easy for un-
employed workers. Clark (2003) studies unemployment polarization and
hysteresis from a psychological perspective using the British Household
Panel Study surveys. This paper will contribute to the literature using two
recent large surveys from the United States. Our primary purpose will be to
estimate the spillover eﬀects of local and state-level average unemployment
rates on the subjective well-being of individual respondents. By estimating
these eﬀects separately for diﬀerent segments of the labour force, and espe-
cially distinguishing the employed and unemployed, we are able to nest the
speciﬁcations tested in earlier studies, as well as to compare spillovers at
diﬀerent levels of geography. More precise estimation and understanding
of the spillover eﬀects of unemployment are essential for any cost-beneﬁt
analysis of policies designed to mitigate the economic and social costs of
unemployment.
The new surveys are the Gallup Daily Poll between 2008 and 2009
and the Center of Disease Control’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS) between 2005 and 2009; the former has 0.7 million usable
observations; the latter has 1.6 million. We derive multiple measures of
well-being from the surveys, including self assessments of life, mental health
and emotional experiences. The paper will add to a literature in which US
1studies were based mostly on the happiness question in the relatively small
General Social Surveys (GSS).
Our primary goal is to provide more conclusive evidence on the spillover
eﬀects of unemployment on those who are not themselves unemployed.
There are conﬂicting reports in the literature. Di Tella et al. (2001) and
Wolfers (2003) ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects from multiple surveys.
Clark (2003) and Mavridis (2010), using the British Household Panel Study
surveys, uncover no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. The estimates in Mavridis
(2010), from 16 waves with about 110,000 observations, are essentially zero
for the still-employed workers. Interpreting these ﬁndings is complicated
by diﬀerences in measuring well-being (mental health versus self-reported
happiness/satisfaction) and by reference populations (whether those out-
side the labor force are excluded). The two US surveys provide a chance for
direct comparison because each of them has both types of measure. We use
both county and state unemployment statistics, alternatively and together,
to test the geographic extent of the spillover eﬀects. For further robustness,
we adopt an alternative identiﬁcation strategy using exogenous variations
in a county’s labor market conditions based on industrial information.
The second question we ask is whether unemployed workers feel better
when aggregate unemployment is high. Clark (2003) ﬁnds from the British
surveys that greater regional unemployment narrows the well-being gap
between employed and unemployed workers in the region, an observation
he attributes to changes in the social norm of employment that have the
potential to slow down labor markets’ adjustment after negative shocks.
The twelve-country European study in Di Tella et al. (2003), although not
mainly intended to test this hypothesis, has opposite ﬁndings: a higher
national unemployment rate raises the well-being gap instead of narrowing
2it. The new surveys in this paper will provide evidence based on Ameri-
can data and will also be able to test whether diﬀerent ways of measuring
well-being might have contributed to the conﬂicting ﬁndings. The third
question concerns the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the well-being
of the unemployed. Di Tella et al. (2003) test the hypothesis that gener-
ous welfare provisions make life too easy for unemployed workers, which
might have led to poor labor market performance in a number of European
countries. Their analysis suggests that hypothesis is not supported by the
data: a more generous unemployment beneﬁt does not raise life satisfac-
tion any more for the unemployed than for the employed. In this paper
we test the hypothesis with American data by exploiting inter-state diﬀer-
ences in state-administrated Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs. The
programs are essentially the same system but often have sharply diﬀerent
beneﬁt levels and other characteristics (Krueger and Meyer (2002)).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture and identiﬁes areas where this paper hopes to contribute. Section 3
describes the data and the basic estimation method. Section 4 presents
empirical ﬁndings in the following order: Subsection 4.1 focuses on the
spillover eﬀect of unemployment; Subsection 4.2 revisits the social-norm
hypothesis; and Subsection 4.3 studies unemployment beneﬁts. Section 5
concludes.
2 Literature review and this paper’s contri-
butions
The literature on the macroeconomics of well-being can be traced back to
the seminal paper Easterlin (1974) showing that the rise of income in the
US since 1946 was not accompanied by a increase in its population’s hap-
3piness. A more recent body of literature started with Di Tella et al. (2001).
That paper’s objective was to use subjective well-being data to evaluate the
tradeoﬀs between unemployment and inﬂation. Its main data are derived
from Euro-Barometer surveys in twelve European countries between 1975
and 1991. The survey asks “On the whole, are you very satisﬁed, fairly
satisﬁed, not very satisﬁed, or not at all satisﬁed with the life you lead?”
Di Tella et al. (2001) aggregate individuals’ responses, after adjusting for
personal characteristics, into a country-year panel. Using the aggregated
measure as the dependent variable in panel regressions, they ﬁnd that both
unemployment and inﬂation reduce satisfaction but the coeﬃcient on the
unemployment rate is almost twice as large as the coeﬃcient on the rate
of inﬂation. Hence the “misery index,” which assigns equal weights to in-
ﬂation and unemployment, “underweights the unhappiness caused by job-
lessness” (P340).
Di Tella et al. (2003) expand the study to cover more macroeconomic
factors. Continuing the use of life satisfaction in the Euro-Barometer sur-
veys, these researchers regress individual life evaluations on personal as well
as macroeconomic variables. The macro variables of interest include GDP,
unemployment rates, inﬂation and the generosity of unemployment bene-
ﬁts. They ﬁnd that both the level of and the changes in GDP have positive
eﬀects on life satisfaction; but there is some evidence of adaptation. On
aggregate unemployment, they ﬁnd “important psychic losses” of recession
that go beyond personal losses of unemployed workers and those associated
with lower income. Speciﬁcally, the national unemployment rate attracts a
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient in regressions that already include each re-
spondent’s own unemployment status and changes in GDP. They attribute
the economy-wide eﬀect to the fear of unemployment among those who are
4in work or at home. Finally, they ﬁnd that the generosity of unemployment
beneﬁts, measured as replacement rates, is positively correlated with a na-
tion’s average satisfaction with life. The beneﬁts do not, however, aﬀect
the satisfaction gap between employed and unemployed workers.
Wolfers (2003) also uses the Euro-Barometer as the main source of
data. The paper ﬁrst replicates the key ﬁndings in Di Tella et al. (2001),
with an expanded sample, that both inﬂation and aggregate unemployment
lower life satisfaction, and that a 1% increase in unemployment rate has
greater impact than a 1% increase in the rate of inﬂation. The paper then
extends the literature to include measures of economic volatility. It ﬁnds
that greater unemployment volatility lowers well-being.
Di Tella et al. (2001), Di Tella et al. (2003) and Wolfers (2003) also
report a number of conclusions based on US data. All of them use the
General Social Survey (GSS) that interviews about 1,500 individuals each
year. Di Tella et al. (2001) and Di Tella et al. (2003) use surveys between
1972 and 1994 with about 27,000 observations; Wolfers (2003) uses 1973-
1998 surveys with 37,000 observations. The GSS has a three-step happiness
question “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days -
would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”
Di Tella et al. (2001) derive an adjusted measure of average happiness
for each year, and ﬁnd that it is negatively correlated with the year-to-
year changes in inﬂation and in unemployment; a stronger correlation is
found with changes in unemployment rate than with the rate of inﬂation.
Di Tella et al. (2003) report a regression at the individual level that shows
a large negative eﬀect of personal unemployment status. Wolfers (2003)
regresses individuals’ happiness on labor market conditions measured at
the state-year level; the unemployment rate attracts a signiﬁcantly negative
5coeﬃcient.
Our paper will add to the US-based empirical work by applying the
BRFSS and the Gallup Daily Poll to the information base. Each of the
two surveys is hundreds of times larger than the GSS on an annual basis,
and each includes multiple measures of well-being. They are being used
elsewhere for general studies of well-being.1 Here we use them to analyze
the impacts of unemployment conditions. Detailed descriptions of the sur-
veys are in the next section. Here we point out that, while we gain in
sample size, we lose in number of years. The BRFSS did not include a life
satisfaction question until 2005; the Gallup survey started in 2008. But
the two surveys provide a ﬁner geographical identiﬁcation of residential ar-
eas, thus admitting greater variety in labor market conditions to enter the
analysis. Both surveys identify county of residence for individual survey
respondents. This allows the use of county-level unemployment statistics
as well as those at the state level as in Wolfers (2003). We consider this as
an improvement because 75% of workers are employed within their county
of residence, according to the 2000 US census.2 To the extent that there is
heterogeneity within a state, county-level statistics provide a more accurate
description of the conditions that an individual respondent is facing. There
are 3,141 counties and equivalents in the US; almost all are included in the
Gallup survey; more than two thirds of them are covered in the BRFSS.
We now return to ﬁnishing the literature review and identify other ar-
eas where we hope to contribute. Regarding the spillover eﬀect of un-
employment on those who are not unemployed, there are conﬂicting ﬁnd-
ings in the literature, complicated by diﬀerent measures of well-being and
1The BRFSS is used in Oswald and Wu (2010) to ﬁnd objective conﬁrmation for
subjective measures of well-being.
2Source: 2000 Census Summary File 3. At the national level, the ratio of people
working in the county of residence to the total number of workers 16 and over is 0.748.
6sample-selection criterions. Di Tella et al. (2001) use life satisfaction in the
Euro-Barometer and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects of unemployment
on the entire population. Clark (2003) and Mavridis (2010), using mea-
sure of mental health and labor force only, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects from
the British Household Panel Study surveys. Wolfers (2003) uses the same
British surveys and reports negative correlations between regional unem-
ployment rates and most of the twelve questions in the General Health
Questionnaire. Because these questions are exactly the ones used to derive
the GHQ score in Clark (2003) and Mavridis (2010), and their regression
methods are similar,3 the diﬀerence likely comes from the inclusion or ex-
clusion of respondents who are not in the labor force. We will estimate
the eﬀects using the new US data, using both self-reported satisfaction
and mental health, on both the whole population and the working sample.
This should provide more conclusive evidence about the sign and size of
the spillover eﬀects of unemployment.
The main interest of Clark (2003) is in social norms and their inﬂuence
on labor market performance; but there are conﬂicting reports from the
literature as well. Clark hypothesizes that an increase in unemployment
weakens the adherence to the norm of employment; the change will im-
prove unemployed workers’ well-being but may reduce their eﬀort to look
for jobs. From the ﬁrst seven waves of the British Household Panel Study
surveys in the 1990s, Clark ﬁnds that higher levels of unemployment in ref-
erence groups improve unemployed workers’ mental wellness. His evidence
includes regressions of a well-being equation where the right-hand-side vari-
ables include an interactive term between the regional unemployment rate
and each individual’s own unemployment status. The interactive term at-
3Both Wolfers (2003) and Mavridis (2010) control for regional and year eﬀects.
7tracts a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient, suggesting that the well-being gap
between employed and unemployed workers is narrower in regions where
unemployment rate is higher. The ﬁnding has important implications; it
suggests that the adjustment process in labor market after negative shocks
can be slowed down by changes in social norms; the process may even end
with a new and higher level of unemployment. However, Di Tella et al.
(2003) ﬁnds precisely the opposite using a 12-country European sample.
Albeit not focusing on social norms, the paper does examine the well-being
gap between employed and unemployed workers. Their regressions (Table
12 and 13 of the cited paper) indicate that a rise in national unemployment
has greater negative eﬀects on workers who are unemployed; the well-being
gap rises with the unemployment rate, often with statistical signiﬁcance.
These contrasting results, even with the diﬀerences in estimation meth-
ods between the two papers, are puzzling.4 The two studies measure well-
being diﬀerently. Clark (2003) uses a measure of mental health that is de-
rived from questions on feelings of strain, depression and others. Di Tella
et al. (2003) use self-reported life satisfaction. The US surveys we use have
both types of variables, thus oﬀering a chance to test whether the choice of
well-being measure might have played a role. More generally, the US data
will add to the body of empirical evidence on this issue, which thus far
is based on European surveys. Here we point out that the Gallup survey
is currently not including the individual-level unemployment indicator in
their data release. Thus our analysis of the well-being gap between em-
ployed and unemployed workers can only be done in the BRFSS, which has
1.6 million usable observations.
Another of our interests is in unemployment insurance. As noted earlier,
4Clark (2003) uses within-UK variations with samples covering seven years. Di Tella
et al. (2003) use a much longer sample that also controls for national ﬁxed eﬀects.
8Di Tella et al. (2003) use well-being data to test whether European-style
welfare state might have been responsible for the poor labor market per-
formance in parts of Europe. It does so by linking employed-unemployed
gaps in life satisfaction to the replacement rates of unemployment beneﬁts.
They ﬁnd no correlation; the personal loss from being unemployed relative
to being employed is severe and does not appear to be any smaller with
higher beneﬁts. We will apply the BRFSS to the same test, exploiting
variations in UI programs across states in the US. The US programs are
administrated under a joint federal-state framework. Each state adminis-
ters a separate program within federal guidelines. Eligibility, beneﬁt and
maximum length of time are determined by state laws (US Department of
Labor). Krueger and Meyer (2002) suggest that the features of the US state
programs, being essentially the same system but often with sharp diﬀer-
ence in beneﬁt levels and other characteristics, may oﬀer the best empirical
evidence on the labor supply eﬀects of social insurance.5
3 Data and the estimation method
3.1 Measures of well-being
We use two surveys for our measures of well-being. One of them is the
CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS
is a state-based system of surveys collecting information on health risk be-
haviors, preventive health practices, and health care access. The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention is responsible for conducting the random
digit dial telephone surveys. The BRFSS contains information from more
than 350,000 American adults (age 18 and over) each year. The annual
5Krueger and Meyer (2002) describes the US programs in greater detail and attributes
the inter-state diﬀerences in the UI programs to the 1935 Social Security Act that gave
states “great latitude in designing their programs.”
9BRFSS micro data is available online.
Starting from 2005, the BRFSS includes a question on life satisfaction:
“In general, how satisﬁed are you with your life?” Respondents choose one
of the following answers: very satisﬁed, satisﬁed, dissatisﬁed, or very dis-
satisﬁed. In the ﬁve years between 2005 and 2009, the BRFSS has collected
the information from 1.8 million Americans. Oswald and Wu (2010), using
the data between 2005 and 2008, found that “[a]cross America, people’s
answers [to the question of life satisfaction in the BRFSS] trace out the
same pattern of quality of life as previously estimated, from solely nonsub-
jective data... There is a state-by-state match (r = 0.6, P < 0.001) between
subjective and objective well-being.”
Another measure of well-being in the BRFSS concerns mental stress,
derived from the following question: “Now thinking about your mental
health, which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions,
for how many days during the past 30 days was your mental health not
good?” In using this measure of mental wellbeing, we follow the approach
in Clark (2003), whose proxy measure for utility is the “GHQ-12 measure”
constructed from twelve questions covering feelings of strain, depression,
inability to cope, and others. Compared to GHQ-12, one advantage of the
mental health variable in the BRFSS is that the answer to the question
is in number of days, a well-deﬁned cardinal measure that has an easy
interpretation.
Figure 1 presents the distributions of the two measures of well-being.
These histograms show an American population that is by and large happy;
overwhelmingly (94%), they are satisﬁed or very satisﬁed with their lives;
slightly more choose “satisﬁed” as opposed to the top category. Among the
rest, 5% say they are dissatisﬁed, only 1% choose “very dissatisﬁed.” For the
10measure of mental health, most Americans (69%) says they never have any
days in the past 30 when mental health was not good. Perhaps the use of the
words “mental health” makes the question sound clinical thus discouraging
reporting. The rest reports any value between 1 and 30. There is high
correlation between life satisfaction and mental health. Among those who
report zero mentally unhealthy days, 54% say they are “very satisﬁed;”
only 27% say so among those who report positive number of unhealthy
days. The latter groups are much more likely to report dissatisfaction
(“dissatisﬁed” or “very dissatisﬁed”) than the former, 13% to 2%.
The second survey we use is the Gallup Daily Poll, which is a well-being-
oriented survey including many more measures of well-being than does the
BRFSS. One of those measures is the Cantril Self-Anchoring Ladder (life
ladder or ladder hereafter). The ladder is the response to the following
question: “Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the
bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder
represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder
would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that
the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the
step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you
feel?” The response thus has 11 levels from 0 to 10 in an ascending order,
with higher values indicating better outcomes.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 2 presents the distribution of the life ladder.
The picture shows a distribution heavy on the upper side of the scale. More
than 70% of survey respondents choose 6 or above (the middle rung is 5);
the mode is 8 with a mass of 25%; 9 and 10 each accounts for 9%. Among
the rest, 15% choose 5, 10% choose between 0 and 4.
11For extra measures of well-being, we use a set of questions in the Gallup
Daily Poll that are designed to measure emotional health. The survey
asks its respondents a list of questions about their experience during the
day before the interview. The answers to many of those questions reveal
positive or negative emotional feelings. There is a range of questions; some
were experimental, and used only in early stages of the survey; some were
included only at a later stage. We identify eight questions in part based
on availability. Here is the list; the ﬁrst four questions describe positive
emotions; the second four negative ones:
 Did you smile or laugh a lot yesterday?
 Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about enjoyment?
 Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about happiness?
 Did you learn or do something interesting yesterday?
 Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about worry?
 Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about sadness?
 Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about stress?
 Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about anger?
12These questions allow us to construct measures of emotional health sim-
ilar to the GHQ-12 measure that Clark (2003) uses. His is the Caseness
GHQ score, counting the number of questions for which the response in-
dicates low well-being. Here we modify the approach by splitting the set
of questions into positive and the negative groups. Speciﬁcally, we count
the number of “yes” answers to the ﬁrst four questions to reach a score
of positive emotions. The scores have ﬁve steps from 0 to 4; zero means
that the respondent reports no positive experiences; four means all four
are reported. In a symmetrical manner, we construct the score of negative
emotions based on the second group of four questions.
The second and the third panels in Figure 2 show the distributions of
the two scores. For the positive score, more than 50% have the maximum
score of four. Slightly less than 30% have a score of three; 14% have a score
at 2 or 1; only 4% report no positive emotions whatsoever. For the score
of negative emotion, about 50% report zero negative experience; 20% have
a score of one; 15% two; 10% three; leaving only 5% at 4.
In addition to the two scores of emotions, we use the same set of ques-
tions to construct a proxy for the U-index that was introduced in Kahne-
man and Krueger (2006), who voice doubt about measuring life satisfaction
with numerical scales, because “there is no guarantee that respondents use
the scales comparably. ( Kahneman and Krueger (2006))” Instead they
proposed a U-index (“U” is for “unpleasant” or “undesirable”) to measure
the proportion of time an individual spends in an unpleasant state. The
construction of such index involves two steps; the ﬁrst is to categorize an
episode, in a dichotomous manner, into unpleasant or pleasant; the second
step is to compute the fraction of time that is spent in an unpleasant state;
the result is the U-index. The Gallup Daily Poll does not allow a literal
13construction of the index, because it does not record minutes or hours as-
sociated with each mood or experience. Instead we construct a proxy by
comparing the score of negative experiences to the score of positive ones.
If the negative score is strictly greater than the positive one, we classify
the respondent’s day (before the interview) as an “unpleasant” one in the
dichotomous manner advocated in Kahneman and Krueger (2006) and as-
sign the value 1 to the index; otherwise the index is zero. In the Gallup
survey, 11% of respondents have a u-index that is 1.
To summarize, the two surveys provide us with six measures of well-
being. In the BRFSS we have the four-step life satisfaction measure and the
number of days when mental health is not good. In the Gallup Daily Poll
we have four measures: the 11-step life ladder, a 5-step score of positive
emotion, a 5-step score of negative emotion, and the 0-or-1 U-index that
indicates the dominance of negative emotions over positive ones.
3.2 Local and state-level statistics
We use county-level unemployment rates as the primary measure of local
labor market conditions. The US has 3,141 counties and equivalents as
of the 2000 census. Most of them are included in our analysis. The un-
employment statistics come from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics
program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). They are available at
monthly frequency. We change the frequency into a quarterly one using
simple averages. We then merge the county-speciﬁc quarterly unemploy-
ment rates into the two surveys. Quarterly frequency is preferred because it
is often used in macroeconomic studies. Our sample has a good coverage in
term of counties. The regression in the Gallup survey includes respondents
from 3,100 counties, almost the entire universe of counties; the BRFSS
sample includes 2,332 counties. The fact that the Gallup Daily Poll has
14more counties likely reﬂects diﬀerences in survey design.
There are other statistics that serve speciﬁc purposes. They include in-
dustrial information used in an instrumental-variable approach and statis-
tics from unemployment insurance programs. We will describe those data
as they enter the analysis.
3.3 Estimation method
Our default approach is to use a two-level regression, so called because it
uses both individual and contextual information to predict individual re-
spondents’ well-being. Individual information includes demographic char-
acteristics and income, among others. Among the contextual variables is
the county-level unemployment rate at the time of interview. Such a two-
level approach, diﬀerent in details, is used in Helliwell (2003), Clark (2003)
and Di Tella et al. (2003). The basic two-level approach is described by the
following equation. Additional variables are added as the paper progresses;
but the following equation provides the foundation, upper-case notation
denoting vectors and the lower case denoting single variables:
w(i;t);j = 0ln(y(i;t)) + X(i;t)1 + 0rj;t + Zj;t1 + Dt2 + u(i;t)
The dependent variable w(i;t);j is the well-being measure of worker i in
county j who is interviewed at time t. In the subscript, we use a parenthesis
to enclose i and t to highlight the fact that the surveys are not longitudinal.
The time subscript t is in unit of quarters, ranging from 2005q1 to 2009q4
in BRFSS, and from 2008q1 to 2009q4 in the Gallup Daily Poll.
The right-hand side of the model includes information at the individual
level, as well as at the county level. One of the individual-level variables is
15the logarithm of household income, or ln(y(i;t)); the log form is increasingly
used in the literature to allow income’s diminishing marginal contribution
to utility, as supported by its empirical dominance over the linear form.
Both the BRFSS and the Gallup Poll have non-trivial portions of respon-
dents who did not provide income information, 11% in the former, and 22%
in the latter. Our strategy is to include a dummy variable in the model
to indicate that income is missing. Another issue is that both surveys
report income in the form of categories. To turn categorical information
into continuous data, we assign to each category a monetary value under
the assumption that the reported income in the survey follows a lognormal
distribution, following the approach in Kahneman and Deaton (2010). To
reduce approximation error, we add to the regression a dummy variable
that indicates the top income category that is open ended.6 The online
Appendix Table A1 and Table A2 describe the distribution of income in
the two surveys.
The relation between well-being and income plays an important role in
our analysis. We assess the quantitative importance of aggregate unem-
ployment’s well-being impact using “compensating diﬀerentials:” namely
the amount of monetary compensation, in percentage terms, that is needed
to maintain an individual’s well-being as the aggregate unemployment rate
rises by one percent. For this approach to work, income must have a sta-
6We did not include a dummy for the lowest income category, because respondents
in the bottom category are either few in number (in BRFSS) or were removed before
regression (in Gallup; more later on this). The top bracket presents a greater concern
because it has a much larger concentration of survey respondents. The BRFSS’s top
bracket starts from $75;000 in annual terms and includes 28% of the respondents. The
Gallup survey’s top bracket starts from $120;000 in annual terms and includes 10% of
the respondents. Following Kahneman and Deaton (2010), we deleted respondents in
the Gallup survey whose reported monthly income are lower than $500, since such values
are unlikely to be serious estimates of household income. The BRFSS’s lowest income
bracket goes up to $10;000 in annual terms; we keep the 4% of survey respondents who
self-identiﬁed into this bracket.
16tistically signiﬁcant impact on well-being. Here we present some simple
plots to illustrate the relationship. Kahneman and Deaton (2010) uses the
Gallup Daily Poll and report an interesting contrast between life evalu-
ations (namely the life ladder) and emotions. They found that the life
ladder has a positive and steady relation with the log of household income;
emotional well-being, on the other hand, rises with log income but ﬂattens
out at higher incomes. We ﬁnd similar but not identical results from the
BRFSS. Figure 3 plots life satisfaction and the measure of mental health
on log household income. Life satisfaction exhibits a positive and linear
relation with log income; increases in log income steadily raise life satisfac-
tion over the entire range. The measure of mental health also rises with
log income, but the relation apparently is stronger at lower levels of income
and weakens as income rises. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings in Kahneman and
Deaton (2010) about the qualitative distinction between life evaluations
and emotional well-being. But we ﬁnd no satiation point of income for the
measure of mental health: an increase in income, even from the high level
of $75,000, still improves mental health (i.e., reducing the number of days
when mental health is not good). Now moving to the Gallup survey, Fig-
ure 4 plots the four measures of well-being against log income. These plots
conﬁrm what is described in Kahneman and Deaton (2010), that the life
ladder shows a steady positive relation with log income, while emotional
well-being increases little, if at all, at high incomes, especially in the case
of negative emotions.
Other personal and demographic information is collected in the vector
X(i;t); its elements include age categories, gender, marital status, educa-
tional attainment and race. In the basic speciﬁcations we do not include
labor force status. The reason is that the Gallup Daily Poll suppresses
17its variable on unemployment status pending the result of an on-going
review of collection methods; as a result we cannot identify who is unem-
ployed at time of interview (we are able to identify the working population
though; more on this later). The lack of unemployment status is a concern
for our interpretation: while the coeﬃcient on aggregate unemployment is
a valid estimate of its population-wide eﬀect, including its eﬀect on the
unemployed, we are not able to distinguish direct from spillover eﬀects.
Fortunately, the BRFSS does have detailed labor force status. Using the
BRFSS we can include each individual’s own unemployment status in the
estimation. We ﬁnd that aggregate unemployment reduces well-being even
among those who are not unemployed. These spillover eﬀects aggregate
to a larger national total than do the direct eﬀects, because they aﬀect a
larger fraction of the population. At the county level our variable of inter-
est is the unemployment rate at time of interview, which we denote with
rj;t; its subscript indicates county j at time t. Other county-level infor-
mation is collected in the vector Zj;t, which includes population density,
urbanization, racial composition of the county population, the percentage
of owner-occupied housing (to measure the stability of population), the me-
dian household income in log form, and longitude and latitude of county
centers. We also include dummies for Alaska and Hawaii, so the longitude
and latitude reﬂect diﬀerence within the continental U.S. Finally, we in-
clude a set of year-quarter dummies Dt in all regressions; controlling for
time dummies is particularly important for the Gallup survey, which in its
experimental stage made changes in the ordering and content of question-
naires; some of those changes might have inﬂuenced average responses to
the well-being questions, making comparison over time problematic.
The on-line appendix Table A3 and A4 present the summary statistics,
18one for the BRFSS, the other for the Gallup Daily Poll.
We use Ordered Probit for all measures of well-being, except for days
when mental health is not good. The probit model avoids cardinal assump-
tions. The healthy days variable, on the other hand, has a clear cardinal
interpretation, so linear regression is applied. All estimations use weights
from the surveys and allow errors to cluster at the county level.
4 Empirical ﬁndings
We present the empirical ﬁndings in the following order: 4.1 describes
aggregate unemployment’s inﬂuence on population well-being. 4.2 tests
whether an increase in local unemployment narrows the well-being gap
between employed and unemployed workers. 4.3 tests whether the gap is
related to the level of UI beneﬁts.
4.1 Aggregate unemployment’s inﬂuence on popula-
tion’s well-being
Table 1 reports the estimates of unemployment’s total eﬀects on the entire
population, including its direct eﬀect on those who become unemployed and
its spillover eﬀects on those who are not themselves unemployed. Table 2
ﬁlters out the direct eﬀect by controlling for own-unemployment status.
Table 3 further narrows down the interest to workers who are still employed.
We noted earlier that the data released to us by Gallup is lacking the
unemployment status of survey participants; the data do, however, provide
good indicators of paid employment, thus allowing us to use all measures
of well-being in the last step.7
7The Gallup interviews in 2008 had a straight-forward question “Do you currently
have a job or work (either paid or unpaid work)?” followed by a question whether
the job was paid or not; identifying paid workers in 2008 is easy. In the 2009 survey,
Gallup asks “Did you work for an employer for any pay in the last seven days?” and
19The primary variable of interest is the county-level unemployment rate
(scaled as a fraction of the labor force). In Table 1, the regressions do
not have each individual’s own unemployment status. So the coeﬃcient
on the unemployment rate captures the total eﬀect. The coeﬃcients are
all negative and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% conﬁdence level. Table 2
controls for each respondents’ own-unemployment status (feasible only for
the BRFSS). Including the personal unemployment status reduces the co-
eﬃcients on the aggregate unemployment rate by about one-third, from
-0.85 to -0.63 in the case of life satisfaction and from 4.7 to 3.0 in the case
of negative mental health. The small reduction in the estimate implies
that the major part of the total negative consequences of unemployment
on subjective well-being is felt by those who are not (yet) themselves unem-
ployed. This is not saying that unemployment matters less for those who
are unemployed. The opposite is true, as the dummy variable indicating
unemployment status attracts coeﬃcients that are much bigger than those
associated with the aggregate unemployment rate. It is just that the total
number of unemployed is small relative to the total size of the population.
Thus the spillover eﬀects of unemployment can be, and are, greater than
the direct eﬀects.
The next table, Table 3, focuses on workers who are currently employed
(feasible for both surveys). Compared to estimates based on the full pop-
ulation in Table 1, the changes in unemployment rate coeﬃcients are all
relatively small except in the case of negative mental health. Speciﬁcally,
the coeﬃcient drops from -0.85 to -0.68 for life satisfaction, from -1.23 to
alternatively “Thinking about your WORK SITUATION over the past 7 days, have
you been employed by an employer from whom you receive money or goods? (This
could be for one or more employers.)” We use positive response to these questions as the
indicator for current employment. This proxy is ﬂawed to the extent that some survey
respondents suﬀered job losses and were interviewed within seven days after the loss.
We have no reason to believe that there are many such cases.
20-1.11 for life ladder, from 0.97 to 0.86 for the u-index, from -0.62 to -0.65
for the score of positive emotion and from 0.64 to 0.47 for the score of
negative emotion. In the case of negative mental health; unemployment
rate’s coeﬃcient falls from 4.74 with strong statistical signiﬁcance to 2.22
with border line signiﬁcance at 10% level.
To summarize, local unemployment has signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects on
well-being among the entire population, including those who are still em-
ployed. There could be many explanations for these spillover eﬀects: even
if a person is not directly inﬂuenced by job losses, his/her family members
might suﬀer from job losses, his/her job safety might be endangered; the
rise in local unemployment could also worsen social conditions and eco-
nomic prospects in local areas. More generally, the local unemployment
may be used by respondents as a general measure of current economic con-
ditions and perhaps even a measure of their own future incomes and job
prospects.8
We now express the unemployment impact in terms of monetary equiv-
alents. The unemployment rate coeﬃcients lack intuitive interpretations
in most cases. One way to gain a quantitative understanding is to com-
pare those coeﬃcients with the coeﬃcients of household income. In our
estimation, household income is in logarithms and the unemployment is in
fractional form; the ratio of the latter’s coeﬃcient to the former’s is the
changes in log income that is equivalent, in term of well-being, to a one-
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Because all the ratios
are negative (meaning that higher unemployment rates have the same well-
8In unreported regressions, we include on the right-hand side the occupation-state
speciﬁc unemployment rate for individual survey respondents, based on the individual’s
occupation and state of residence. This variable in general attracts statistically signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcients that indicate lower well-being, even when the local unemployment rate
is already included on the RHS. This indicates that local market conditions have greater
impact on those whose jobs are less secure.
21being eﬀect as lower household income), we ignore the negative signs. For
the total eﬀect reported in Table 1, the estimated income equivalents for a
1% change in local unemployment rate are 3.1% for life satisfaction, 2.6%
for mental health, 4.6% for life ladder, 3.0% for the u-index, 3.3% for the
score of positive emotions, and 2.5% for the score of negative emotions.
When the samples are the still-employed workers, the numerator falls but
the denominators falls as well. As the result, the income equivalents are
similar to those found from the entire population. These equivalents are,
in the same order as above, 3.1%, 2.4%, 4.1%, 4.3%, 5.9% and 2.6%. In
terms of averages over the six measures, the equivalent is 3.2% for the full
population and 3.7% for the population of employed workers.
Using estimates from the BRFSS, we can break down the total impact
of a 1% rise in the unemployment rate into its direct and indirect eﬀects.
The increase in unemployment reduces the populations well-being in three
diﬀerent ways. The direct monetary loss is the foregone income of those
who become unemployed. The direct nonpecuniary cost is the further loss
of subjective well-being suﬀered by those by those who become unemployed.
The spillover costs are the well-being losses of those who are not themselves
unemployed.
An estimate of the direct monetary loss can be obtained by regressing
the log of household income on personal unemployment status, together
with other covariates in Table 2 including demographic, educational and
other information. In such a regression the unemployment status has a co-
eﬃcient of -0.43, measuring the loss of income from becoming unemployed.
How does this loss aﬀect well-being? The per-unit eﬀect of income on well-
being can be found in Table 2, where the dependent variables are measures
of well-being and the right hand side variables include household income,
22the unemployment status and covariates. In the case of life satisfaction, the
log income has a coeﬃcient of 0.2. A 0.43 reduction in log income there-
fore reduces life satisfaction by 0.086. Also in Table 2 is the coeﬃcient on
the unemployment status, measuring nonpecuniary eﬀect since the income
variable is already controlled for. In the case of life satisfaction, the un-
employment status has a coeﬃcient of -0.39. The ratio of nonpecuniary to
pecuniary eﬀects from becoming unemployed is therefore 0.39/0.086=4.5.
A similar ratio is found using mental health to measure well-being. The
direct monetary loss has the eﬀect of increasing the number of days with
bad mental health by 0.45 in the past 30 days. The nonpecuniary eﬀect is
2.49, or 5.5 times as big. These estimates conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Winkel-
mann and Winkelmann (1998) that the nonpecuniary eﬀect of becoming
unemployed is much larger than the eﬀect stemming from income losses.9
The comparison between the indirect and direct well-being costs of un-
employment can also be done using estimates from Table 2, because its
right-hand side variables include both the personal unemployment status
and the aggregate unemployment rate. In the case of life satisfaction, the
coeﬃcient on the personal unemployment status is -0.39. The coeﬃcient
on the local unemployment rate, on the other hand, is -0.63. Because the
labor force participation rate in the US is about 65%, a 1% increase in
the unemployment rate moves 0.65% of the population from the employ-
ment pool to the unemployment pool. The total direct well-being loss is
0.39*0.65%=0.25%. The indirect loss of well-being to the rest of the popu-
lation is 0.63*1% (because the coeﬃcient on aggregate unemployment rate
9Our approach does not distinguish between temporary and permanent eﬀects of
income changes from unemployment. Knabe and Ratzel (2007) suggest that not making
such distinction leads to overestimating the nonpecuniary costs of unemployment by
about one-third. But because the nonpecuniary costs in our data are ﬁve times as big as
the monetary costs, adjusting the estimates downward by one third would not change
the picture substantially.
23is -0.63 and the change in the unemployment rate is 1%). The ratio of in-
direct to direct well-being loss is therefore 0:63
0:25 = 2:5. When mental health
is used as the well-being measure, the ratio is 1.9.10
To summarize, if the direct monetary loss of the unemployed is 1, then
the additional SWB loss of the unemployed is 5, while at the population
level the spillover eﬀects is 10, making the total well-being costs of unem-
ployment ﬁfteen times larger than those directly due to the lower incomes
of the unemployed.
Before moving on to robustness tests, we would like to emphasize one
feature of our results that speaks to one of the puzzles posed be previous
research. Of all the estimates for unemployment’s spillover eﬀects on well-
being, the weakest estimate in term of statistical signiﬁcance is found for
still-employed workers when the well-being is measured as the days when
mental health is not good, with border-line statistical signiﬁcance at 10%
(all other estimates have signiﬁcance better than 1%). This may explain
why Clark (2003) and Mavridis (2010) fail to uncover signiﬁcantly negative
eﬀects of regional unemployment rates on well-being. Those two studies
measure well-being using the General Health Questionnaire, counting re-
sponses that indicate low mental well-being such as strains, depression and
feeling not being useful. Their sample excludes respondents who are not in
the labor force and controls for own-unemployment status. So the ﬁndings
in their studies correspond best to our estimate from the sample of still-
employed workers, our lowest estimate. Our ﬁndings thus suggest that, if
their study used other measures of well-being and expanded the sample
to include people who are not in the labor force, aggregate unemployment
would likely have been found to have greater negative eﬀects. We thus
10The coeﬃcient on the unemployment status is 2.49; the coeﬃcient on the local
unemployment rate is 3.01. The ratio is therefore 3.01/(2.49*0.65)=1.86.
24conclude that the weak eﬀects found in Clark (2003) and Mavridis (2010)
do not reﬂect unique features of the UK population, but instead are suﬃ-
ciently (although not necessarily) explained by diﬀerences in sampling and
speciﬁcation.
Robustness tests and an alternative identiﬁcation strategy
Here we conduct four robustness checks: to divide the level of unemploy-
ment into changes and lags, to use an instrumental variable for county
unemployment, to replace county data with state-level equivalents, and to
include both county and state-level data simultaneously. We will do so
for two samples: the full population (reported in Table 4) and the still-
employed workers (reported in Table 5).
The upper-most panels in Tables 4 and 5 divide the local unemploy-
ment rates into a base level (same quarter last year) and the change over
the subsequent four quarters. This tests whether recent changes in the un-
employment reduce well-being. We expect so and ﬁnd conﬁrmation. The
base and the change have the same signs in every case in both samples, in
most cases with statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels. We do not
claim a good understanding of the dynamics of unemployment’s impact on
well-being, so we do not have a prior on the relative sizes of the coeﬃcients.
The estimates in Tables 4 present a mixed picture. No consistent pattern
is observed across measures and surveys.
The second panels of the two tables present estimates from an alter-
native identiﬁcation based on an instrumental-variable approach. It is a
response to theoretically possible ambiguity regarding the causation be-
tween local unemployment and self-reported well-being. The causation
may run from happiness to unemployment: a strike or riot by unhappy
residents likely will raise unemployment. At a more fundamental level, we
25cannot be certain whether or not a high level of unemployment is just a
labor-market phenomenon. Could a persistently high unemployment rate
in an area reﬂect certain local social/cultural factors that also have impli-
cations in well-being? For example, if the local governance/culture is such
that there is little stigma associated with being unemployed and there is
reward for claiming unemployment status, the oﬃcial unemployment rates
could be high yet have little negative impact on the well-being of the local
population. In this case, the estimation in Table 1 and 3 will underesti-
mate the eﬀects of an exogenous increase in aggregate unemployment. To
address these concerns, we adopt an instrumental-variable approach, using
variations in unemployment rates that we are conﬁdent are driven only by
labor-market conditions. Speciﬁcally, we compute a time series of “likely
employment losses” for each county as a faction of its employment base
and use it to instrument for the level of unemployment at each point in
time. The likely loss is calculated based on the county’s composition of
employees by industries, together with the state-wide employment losses
by industries over time. More details on the construction of the likely
losses can be found in on-line appendix. Here it suﬃces to say that we
use the current and lagged values of the likely losses for individual coun-
ties to predict their current level of unemployment rates, before using the
predicted values to replace the actual unemployment rates in Table 1 and
3. The ﬁrst stage regression, reported in the on-line appendix, has very
high explanatory power, accounting for more than 60% of within-county
variations.
The estimates based on the instrumental-variable approach show an
unambiguous picture: for all measures of well-being both in the full popu-
lation and in the employed workers, the use of instrumental variable raises
26the size of the local unemployment coeﬃcients, while having little eﬀect
on income coeﬃcients. As the result the income equivalents for changes in
unemployment rate rise. For the full population, the average across the six
measures is 5.4% as opposed to 3.2% from using the actual unemployment
statistics. For the sample of employed workers, it is 7.8% as opposed to
3.7%. For later analysis we will use the actual unemployment rates to stay
on the conservative side.
The third panels of the two tables replace county-level unemployment
rate with state-level unemployment rates. This checks whether the impact
of aggregate unemployment diﬀers by how close it is to individuals in the
surveys. In the absence of county-level unemployment rate, state-level
statistics largely attract similar coeﬃcients as those from the county-level
statistics, and they all have statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels.
The last panel of Tables 4 and 5 has both the state-level unemployment
rates and the county-level unemployment rates on the right hand side of
estimations. With the presence of county statistics, unemployment rates
at the state level largely attract insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients while the coeﬃ-
cients on county-level unemployment are signiﬁcant with expected signs.
Nine out of 12 estimations suggest that bad labor market conditions at the
county level are more damaging than those at the state level. In the case
of the score of positive emotions, after controlling for county-level unem-
ployment, increases in state-level unemployment signiﬁcantly raise positive
emotions among the entire population and among the working population.
One possible explanation is that the misfortune at a broader scale reminds
people of their good fortune in residing in a relatively better-performing
county. It is an interesting question, for which we have no answers, why
such a pattern shows up only for positive emotions.
27To summarize, it is a robust ﬁnding that aggregate unemployment sig-
niﬁcantly reduces the well-being of the population and that of employed
workers. In addition, unemployment tends to hurt more when it is closer
to home (county versus state).
Other estimates
Before further expanding our results on unemployment, we would like to
take a brief detour to discuss Table 1’s other estimates and compare them
to those in the general literature of subjective well-being. Most of the
ﬁndings are familiar from the literature; some are less so. First, higher
household income is associated with higher well-being, a results that is
robust across all measures in both surveys. Married couples are better oﬀ
than the never-married singles by all SWB measures, and singles are better
oﬀ than the divorced, separated, or widowed. There is a robust U-shape in
age: the elderly (age 65 or over) have the best well-being measures except
for the score of positive emotions, where the age 18-29 group wins. The
young, in turn, are mostly better oﬀ than the age 50-64 group. The group
that reports the lowest well-being is those between age 30 and 49. Our
results show a positive eﬀect of higher education, even after controlling for
income. Other studies have found that education has a zero or insigniﬁcant
eﬀect after related economic and social variables are accounted for. Perhaps
our positive results reﬂect the absence of various social capital variables,
such as social trust, which have a positive impact on subjective well-being
(Helliwell and Putnam (2004)) and are themselves positively correlated
with education (Helliwell and Putnam (2003)).
The less familiar observations arise from our use of multiple measures
of well-being. First, let’s look at the relative eﬀects of income. There is
evidence in the literature that the eﬀect of income on well-being depends
28more on relative comparisons, and less on absolute values (Clark and Os-
wald (1996), see Clark et al. (2008) for an extensive review). This suggests
that when private income and neighborhood income are both included in a
regression, the coeﬃcient on the neighborhood income will indicate lower
well-being, as found in Helliwell and Huang (2009), which uses average in-
come at the census tract of residence as contextual income. Table 1 uses
the median household income, in its logged form, at the county level to
capture the relative eﬀects. Comparator income eﬀects with statistical sig-
niﬁcance are found in the cases of life satisfaction in the BRFSS and the
score of negative emotion in the Gallup survey; they are absent for other
measures.
When comparing the level of well-being between genders and racial/ethnicity
groups, we ﬁnd interesting patterns of diﬀerences. On the gender side,
males report lower life satisfaction, lower life ladder, and lower scores of pos-
itive emotions than females, but at the same time they report less mental
stress and less negative emotions, and are less likely to be dominated with
negative emotions. This is consistent with the suicide ﬁndings reported
in Helliwell (2007), showing that females are far more likely than males
to be treated for depression, more than twice as likely to attempt suicide,
but only one-quarter as likely to complete suicide. On the race/ethnicity
dimension, with white as the comparator group, blacks report lower life
satisfaction but higher life ladders; Hispanics report greater well-being in
terms of satisfaction, life ladder and mental stress, but weaklygreater neg-
ative emotion scores.
294.2 Local unemployment and unemployed workers’
well-being: repeating the regression in Clark (2003)
Table 6, which includes each individual’s own-unemployment status, also
has an interactive term between aggregate (local) unemployment rate and
own-unemployment status. Clark (2003) uses the interactive term to cap-
ture the impact of regional unemployment on unemployed workers’ well-
being. His hypothesis is that the increase in aggregate unemployment
weakens the adherence to the norm of employment, which makes currently
unemployed workers feel better, perhaps with the consequence of reducing
their eﬀort in job searches. Following the hypothesis, the coeﬃcient on
the interactive term should indicate positive well-being eﬀects and that the
well-being gap between employed and unemployed workers becomes nar-
rower as unemployment rate rises. Clark (2003) ﬁnds evidence consistent
with the hypothesis in the British Household Panel Study surveys; but as
noted in the literature review, the regressions in Di Tella et al. (2003), on
a sample that includes respondents from twelve European countries, show
the opposite result - that the well-being gap becomes bigger when national
unemployment rate rises.
The estimates in Table 6 are consistent with Clark’s results for both life
satisfaction and for mental health (Clark (2003) uses only mental health).
The coeﬃcients of the interactive terms indicate positive well-being eﬀects
and are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% conﬁdence level. It makes virtually
no diﬀerence whether we run the regressions on the full sample (ﬁrst two
columns) or, as in Clark (2003), on the labor force only (last two columns).
Quantitatively, the estimated coeﬃcients in Clark (2003) suggest that
the well-being gap between employed and unemployed workers will disap-
pear when aggregate unemployment rate is 24%. Our estimates in the last
30two columns of Table 6 suggest that the gap will disappear at 48.5% unem-
ployment rate in the case of life satisfaction and 48.4% in the case of mental
health. We do not have a clear understanding why the break-even point is
higher in the US. Could it be that the country’s social norm of employment
is stronger? There may be diﬀerence in the generosity of unemployment
beneﬁts between UK and US. But our results on unemployment beneﬁts
(to be presented later) suggest that any such diﬀerence is unlikely to be
the explanation.
The ﬁndings in Table 6, robust for both life satisfaction and mental
health, also suggest that the contradictory ﬁndings between Clark (2003)
and Di Tella et al. (2003) are not due to measurement diﬀerences. Clark
uses a measure of mental health; Di Tella et al. (2003) uses self-reported
life satisfaction. The BRFSS has both types of measure; both yield results
consistent to Clark’s ﬁnding. An explanation has to be found elsewhere.
4.3 Unemployment beneﬁts: repeating the test in
Di Tella et al. (2003)
We now move on to test whether the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts
aﬀects the well-being gap between employed and unemployed workers. A
more generous provision, if it makes unemployment relatively painless, may
reduce job-search eﬀorts and lead to bad labor market performance at
the aggregate level. Di Tella et al. (2003) ﬁnds that such hypothesis is
not supported by the data, because unemployment beneﬁt replacement
rates have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the employed-unemployed gap of life
satisfaction in their Euro-Barometer sample. Here we apply the American
BRFSS to the test.
We measure the generosity of state-administrated UI programs with
state-year speciﬁc weekly beneﬁt amounts as fractions of the average weekly
31total wage. We have two such indicators. One uses the maximum beneﬁts
as the numerator; the other’s numerator is the average beneﬁts actually
paid, because not all unemployed workers are entitled to the maximum
amounts. We call the two indicators the maximum beneﬁt replacement rate
and the average beneﬁt replacement rate, respectively. There are large dif-
ferences between states in these generosity measures. Take for example the
year 2008. Mississippi has the lowest maximum beneﬁt replacement rate
among the lower 48 states at 0.29; the highest is 0.83 in Massachusetts;11
the standard deviation is 0.12. For the average replacement rate, the low-
est is 0.27 in New York; the highest is 0.45 in Rhode Island; the standard
deviation is 0.05. We use year speciﬁc replacement rates; but there is little
variation within a state over the time period in our sample (2005-2009);
most of the variations in the data thus come from cross-sectional diﬀerences
by states.
We use the BRFSS for the test; the Gallup survey does not identify
unemployment status in its current release. Within the BRFSS there are
two measures of well-being: life satisfaction and the number of days when
mental health is not good. We use both measures.
Table 7 presents the results. There are four regressions in the table
because we have two alternative measures of well-being and two diﬀerent
replacement rates. The regressions have all the right-hand-side variables
used in the regressions in Table 6 and two extras: a beneﬁts replacement
rate (maximum or average) and an interactive term between the replace-
ment rate and the respondent’s own unemployment status. All regressions
exclude respondents who are not in the labor force or who are self-employed.
So the interactive term captures the correlation between the replacement
11The dollar amounts are $210 and $900 per week, respectively.
32rate and the well-being gap between employed and unemployed workers.
Table 7 does not provide any support to the hypothesis that more generous
beneﬁts narrow the well-being gap, regardless which measure of well-being
and which replacement rate are used. Instead, they show the opposite
correlations: higher level of replacement rates (maximum or average) is
signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the well-being gap (measured
by life satisfaction or by mental health). Interpretation is not straightfor-
ward because of endogeneity: if being unemployed is particularly harsh, the
voters in a state may deliberately legislate a higher level of beneﬁt as a self
insurance. In contrast, Di Tella et al. (2003) did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant cor-
relations. In this aspect, our ﬁndings are diﬀerent from theirs. What is in
common is that both studies ﬁnd the personal loss from being unemployed
is severe (about 1.5 times of the coeﬃcient on log income in our paper),
and it is not any smaller with higher level of unemployment beneﬁts.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of aggregate unemployment on subjec-
tive well-being, using two recent large-scale American surveys, the Gallup
Daily Poll between 2008 and 2009 and the Center of Disease Control’s Be-
havioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) between 2005 and 2009.
Our primary contribution is to add to a literature that is relatively thin
in US-based evidence with larger data (a combined sample of 2.3 millions)
and multiple measures of well-being covering self-assessments of life, mental
health, and emotional experiences. Because of the large samples and simul-
taneous use of multiple well-being measures, we are able to revisit some of
the key issues in the literature, including some that have seen conﬂicting
reports.
33First, and most importantly, we ﬁnd robust evidence, consistent across
measures and surveys, that unemployment has signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects
on those who are not themselves unemployed. The evidence also holds up
well in an instrumental variable approach when local unemployment rates
are replaced with information based on external industrial trends. Further-
more, we ﬁnd that unemployment hurts more when it is closer to home:
county-level unemployment rates overwhelmingly dominate state-level un-
employment when both are present in our estimations. Finally, we ﬁnd
evidence suggesting that the weak spillover eﬀects detected in Clark (2003)
and Mavridis (2010) probably arise from the nature of their measure of well-
being and the choice reference groups, and does not reﬂect some intrinsic
diﬀerence between the UK and the US populations. In the aggregate, these
spillover eﬀects are twice as large as the direct well-being costs for the un-
employed themselves, and ﬁfteen times as large as the well-being eﬀects of
the smaller incomes of the unemployed.
Second, we conﬁrm the social-norm hypothesis in Clark (2003) that
greater unemployment at the aggregate level narrows the well-being gap
between employed and unemployed workers. The ﬁndings in Clark (2003)
is based on UK surveys; ours is based on US ones. In the US, the break-even
point where the gap disappears is 48%, twice the size as that in UK.
Finally, we revisit Di Tella et al. (2003)’s study on the link between
unemployment beneﬁts and well-being gap between employed and unem-
ployed workers. Similar to the European study in Di Tella et al. (2003),
we uncover no evidence to support the view that unemployment beneﬁts
have made life too easy for the unemployed. To the contrary, we ﬁnd the
well-being gap to be greater in states that have higher beneﬁt replacement
rates (either measured at the legal maximum or at the average). Perhaps
34the harshness of unemployment has an inﬂuence on the legislation on un-
employment insurance.
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Notes: (1) Life satisfaction uses the left-hand side scale. (2) Mental health uses
the right-hand side scale; it is deﬁned as 30 minus the number of days when
mental health is not good in the past 30 days.
Figure 4: Plotting the measures of well-being from Gallup Daily Poll on
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u-index
Monthly_low Monthly_high mean(ladder) mean(uindex) mean(posEmo~n) mean(negEmo~n)
Assigned midpoint value in annual terms log value ladder log value posEmotion
500 999 5.827955 0.244011 2.741026 1.544852 9818.80 9818.80 5.827955 9818.80 2.741026
1000 1999 6.02913 0.169923 2.958915 1.279512 19576.58 19576.58 6.02913 19576.58 2.958915
2000 2999 6.30241 0.125021 3.113537 1.106802 31287.04 31287.04 6.30241 31287.04 3.113537
3000 3999 6.581492 0.100825 3.199466 0.999771 43020.71 43020.71 6.581492 43020.71 3.199466
4000 4999 6.778911 0.086228 3.252635 0.946632 55602.77 55602.77 6.778911 55602.77 3.252635
5000 7499 7.020014 0.072969 3.307126 0.907059 77135.01 77135.01 7.020014 77135.01 3.307126
7500 9999 7.226782 0.065617 3.346339 0.886875 110859.96 110859.96 7.226782 110859.96 3.346339
10000 7.374241 0.06534 3.36918 0.89621 180337.63 180337.63 7.374241 180337.63 3.36918
log value u-index log value negEmotion
9818.80 0.244011 9818.80 1.544852
19576.58 0.169923 19576.58 1.279512
31287.04 0.125021 31287.04 1.106802
43020.71 0.100825 43020.71 0.999771
55602.77 0.086228 55602.77 0.946632
77135.01 0.072969 77135.01 0.907059
110859.96 0.065617 110859.96 0.886875
180337.63 0.06534 180337.63 0.89621
Approximating midpoints assuming lognormal distribution of household income
Monthly_low Monthly_high Yearly_lowYearly_high% inwhoe sample % in sample with valid income information Percentile Associated z score in a normal distribution based on the percntiles Mid point of the interval as percentile Z score associated with the midpoint Mean Implied standard deviation based on the cutoffs The average implied standard deviation Implied log value based on the standard deviation and the mid point Monetary value of the midpoint
40Table 1: Total eﬀects of unemployment
lsatisfy negMental ladder uindex posEmotionnegEmotion
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of household income 0.27 -1.85 0.27 -.32 0.19 -.26
(0.009) (0.07) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.85 4.74 -1.23 0.97 -.62 0.64
(0.14) (0.99) (0.11) (0.17) (0.1) (0.11)
Male -.06 -.91 -.14 -.09 -.05 -.13
(0.005) (0.02) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 18 to 29 0.16 -.19 0.17 -.22 0.2 -.04
(0.008) (0.05) (0.006) (0.01) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 50 to 64 0.04 -.31 0.04 -.04 0.007 -.15
(0.006) (0.04) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 65 or above 0.35 -2.65 0.37 -.46 0.14 -.62
(0.008) (0.06) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Edu: High sch. or below -.06 0.06 -.03 0.1 -.15 -.008
(0.007) (0.03) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Edu: University degree 0.15 -.77 0.18 -.10 0.1 -.04
(0.005) (0.03) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Married/with partner 0.31 -.38 0.08 -.06 0.07 -.003
(0.008) (0.05) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Divorced/seprt./widowed -.05 0.77 -.11 0.14 -.06 0.13
(0.008) (0.05) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Race: Black -.04 -.51 0.06 -.05 0.02 -.17
(0.009) (0.06) (0.009) (0.01) (0.008) (0.009)
Race: Hispanic 0.06 -1.02 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.06) (0.007) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008)
Race: Others -.11 -.07 -.08 0.09 -.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.08) (0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009)
Log(median HH inc. in cnty) -.04 -.11 -.01 -.006 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Log(pop./sq. mile in cnty) -.02 0.07 -.02 0.03 -.02 0.03
(0.004) (0.02) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1567150 1545405 661330 652948 654880 662561
R2 0.05
F statistic 453.54 . 632.22 312.4 312.61 536.94
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
quarterly time dummies, the indicator of top income bracket, an indicator for
missing income information, county-level share of urban population, of
owner-occupied housing, of black residents, of Hispanic residents, and of other
minorities, the longitude and latitude of county centres, and indicators for
Alaska and Hawaii. (5) The 2nd column uses survey linear regression; others
use survey ordered probit. All use weights from survey and allow errors to
cluster at county level.




Log of household income 0.2 -1.04
(0.008) (0.05)
LFS: Unemployed -.39 2.49
(0.01) (0.08)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.63 3.01
(0.14) (0.96)
LFS: Self-employed 0.02 0.17
(0.009) (0.06)
LFS: Retired 0.09 0.26
(0.007) (0.05)
LFS: Student 0.13 0.24
(0.01) (0.1)
LFS: Home maker 0.06 0.11
(0.007) (0.05)
LFS: Disability -.61 7.20
(0.01) (0.1)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1567150 1545405
R2 0.09
F statistic 469.66 .
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
all the variables that are present in Table 1 and those that are mentioned in its
footnote #4. (5) Survey order probit is used for life satisfaction; survey linear
is used for mental health. All the estimations uses weights and allow error to
cluster at the county level.
42Table 3: Indirect eﬀect of unemployment on still-employed workers
lsatisfy negMental ladder uindex posEmotionnegEmotion
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of household income 0.22 -.91 0.27 -.20 0.11 -.18
(0.01) (0.07) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.68 2.22 -1.11 0.86 -.65 0.47
(0.19) (1.21) (0.15) (0.21) (0.14) (0.13)
Male -.04 -1.12 -.10 -.11 -.03 -.14
(0.006) (0.03) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Age 18 to 29 0.1 0.39 0.15 -.15 0.14 0.009
(0.01) (0.05) (0.008) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008)
Age 50 to 64 0.04 -.52 0.03 -.09 0.04 -.16
(0.006) (0.03) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Age 65 or above 0.31 -1.99 0.32 -.43 0.22 -.47
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Edu: High sch. or below -.04 0.04 -.06 0.05 -.11 -.04
(0.009) (0.04) (0.006) (0.01) (0.007) (0.007)
Edu: University degree 0.16 -.67 0.18 -.10 0.1 -.01
(0.007) (0.03) (0.006) (0.01) (0.006) (0.006)
Married/with partner 0.32 -.34 0.08 -.06 0.07 0.0007
(0.01) (0.06) (0.007) (0.01) (0.007) (0.007)
Divorced/seprt./widowed -.05 0.8 -.16 0.14 -.04 0.14
(0.01) (0.06) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009)
Race: Black -.06 -.52 -.008 -.02 -.004 -.17
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Race: Hispanic 0.07 -.61 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Race: Others -.12 -.18 -.08 0.08 -.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.1) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(median HH inc. in cnty) -.06 -.02 -.02 0.07 -.04 0.08
(0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Log(pop./sq. mile in cnty) -.02 0.05 -.02 0.02 -.01 0.02
(0.005) (0.03) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 713046 707195 332577 329578 330223 332662
R2 0.03
F statistic 273.79 . 380.82 94.69 108.16 184.36
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
quarterly time dummies, the indicator of top income bracket, an indicator for
missing income information, county-level share of urban population, of
owner-occupied housing, of black residents, of Hispanic residents, and of other
minorities, the longitude and latitude of county centres, and indicators for
Alaska and Hawaii. (5) The 2nd column uses survey linear regression; others
use survey ordered probit. All use weights from survey and allow errors to
cluster at county level.
43Table 4: Various robustness tests on Table 1
lsatisfy negMental ladder uindex posEmotionnegEmotion
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Use lag and changes in UR
Log of household income 0.27 -1.85 0.27 -.32 0.19 -.26
(0.009) (0.07) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
UR minus UR 4 qtrs ago -.40 3.47 -1.30 1.00 -.23 0.93
(0.23) (1.84) (0.21) (0.32) (0.2) (0.21)
UR 4 qtrs ago -1.10 5.46 -1.18 0.96 -.90 0.44
(0.18) (1.24) (0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.15)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1566208 1544488 661330 652948 654880 662561
R2 0.05
F statistic 447.13 . 620.22 303.57 303.96 527.86
Instrumental-variable approach
Log of household income 0.27 -1.83 0.27 -.32 0.19 -.26
(0.01) (0.07) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
UR in cnty, instrumented -1.01 5.20 -3.41 1.61 -.68 1.20
(0.36) (2.02) (0.34) (0.47) (0.3) (0.33)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1395305 1375905 498977 492569 494048 500148
R2 0.05
F statistic 474.4 . 539.75 261.81 265.15 454.45
Use state-level UR
Log of household income 0.28 -1.85 0.27 -.32 0.19 -.26
(0.009) (0.06) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
URST: unemp. rate in state -.86 4.82 -1.38 0.91 -.41 0.67
(0.2) (1.33) (0.16) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1596753 1574642 670989 662483 664448 672230
R2 0.05
F statistic 484.66 . 638.34 313.08 297.79 540.52
Use both county & state UR
Log of household income 0.27 -1.85 0.27 -.32 0.19 -.26
(0.009) (0.07) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.80 4.19 -1.09 1.06 -.88 0.62
(0.19) (1.26) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.14)
URST: unemp. rate in state -.10 1.04 -.27 -.16 0.48 0.05
(0.28) (1.71) (0.21) (0.32) (0.21) (0.21)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1567150 1545405 661330 652948 654880 662561
R2 0.05
F statistic 444.1 . 620.24 303.66 303.37 521.06
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
all the variables that are present in Table 1 and those that are mentioned in its
footnote #4. (5) The 2nd column uses survey linear regression; others use
survey ordered probit; all use weights; errors clustered at county level. 44Table 5: Various robustness tests on Table 3
lsatisfynegMental ladder uindex posEmotionnegEmotion
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Use lag and changes in UR
Log of household income 0.22 -.91 0.27 -.20 0.11 -.18
(0.01) (0.07) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
UR minus UR 4 qtrs ago -.64 1.38 -1.25 1.28 -.55 0.86
(0.34) (2.12) (0.3) (0.44) (0.26) (0.27)
UR 4 qtrs ago -.70 2.71 -1.01 0.54 -.72 0.18
(0.26) (1.50) (0.24) (0.33) (0.22) (0.21)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 712576 706734 332577 329578 330223 332662
R2 0.03
F statistic 268.66 . 375.9 91.97 105.37 180.66
Instrumental-variable approach
Log of household income 0.22 -.88 0.28 -.21 0.12 -.18
(0.01) (0.07) (0.007) (0.01) (0.006) (0.006)
UR in cnty, instrumented -1.51 2.41 -3.12 2.20 -1.11 1.11
(0.45) (2.34) (0.44) (0.57) (0.39) (0.36)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 641571 636246 270577 268082 268614 270682
R2 0.03
F statistic 259.32 . 321.69 87.51 105.64 152.55
Use state-level UR
Log of household income 0.22 -.91 0.27 -.20 0.11 -.18
(0.01) (0.07) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
URST: unemp. rate in state -.98 2.70 -1.31 0.71 -.31 0.6
(0.24) (1.48) (0.21) (0.29) (0.19) (0.17)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 727270 721315 337801 334759 335414 337888
R2 0.03
F statistic 276.66 . 391.56 96.22 107.99 187.77
Use both county & state UR
Log of household income 0.22 -.91 0.27 -.20 0.11 -.18
(0.01) (0.07) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.29 1.40 -.86 0.97 -1.02 0.28
(0.26) (1.67) (0.22) (0.3) (0.22) (0.2)
URST: unemp. rate in state -.70 1.50 -.45 -.20 0.68 0.33
(0.34) (2.05) (0.3) (0.43) (0.3) (0.27)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 713046 707195 332577 329578 330223 332662
R2 0.03
F statistic 267.38 . 372.01 91.94 104.88 178.85
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
all the variables that are present in Table 1 and those that are mentioned in its
footnote #4. (5) The 2nd column uses survey linear regression; others use
survey ordered probit; all use weights; errors clustered at county level.
45Table 6: Social norm hypothesis in Clark (2003)
lsatisfy negMentallsatisfynegMental
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of household income 0.2 -1.04 0.21 -1.11
(0.008) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07)
LFS: Unemployed -.46 2.90 -.47 2.81
(0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.19)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.72 3.54 -.79 2.52
(0.13) (0.95) (0.19) (1.23)
Interactive: LFS:Unemployed*UR 0.94 -6.04 0.97 -5.80
(0.3) (2.39) (0.31) (2.47)
LFS: Self-employed 0.02 0.17
(0.009) (0.06)
LFS: Retired 0.09 0.26
(0.007) (0.05)
LFS: Student 0.13 0.24
(0.01) (0.1)
LFS: Home maker 0.06 0.11
(0.007) (0.05)
LFS: Disability -.61 7.20
(0.01) (0.1)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 1567150 1545405 780669 773615
R2 0.09 0.05
F statistic 470.33 . 304.23 .
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
all the variables that are present in Table 1 and those that are mentioned in its
footnote #4. (5) Survey order probit is used for life satisfaction; survey linear
is used for mental health. All the estimations uses weights and allow error to
cluster at the county level; (6) The last two columns exclude respondents who
are not in labor force and those who are self-employed.
46Table 7: Well-being and unemployment insurance
lsatisfynegMentallsatisfynegMental
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of household income 0.21 -1.11 0.21 -1.11
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
LFS: Unemployed -.30 1.41 -.38 2.18
(0.11) (0.68) (0.06) (0.38)
UR: unemp. rate in county -.80 2.45 -.80 2.53
(0.19) (1.24) (0.19) (1.23)
Interactive: LFS:Unemployed*UR 0.96 -5.74 0.95 -5.68
(0.31) (2.44) (0.31) (2.46)
Avg. beneﬁt replacement (frac.) 0.03 -.65
(0.08) (0.42)
LFS: Unemployed*Avg. replacement -.50 4.12
(0.29) (1.85)
Max. beneﬁt replacement (frac.) 0.01 0.15
(0.03) (0.16)
LFS: Unemployed*Max. replacement -.17 1.29
(0.1) (0.63)
Other variables: see footnote 4
Obs. 780669 773615 780669 773615
R2 0.05 0.05
F statistic 329.07 . 315.13 .
Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Other variables include
all the variables that are present in Table 1 and those that are mentioned in its
footnote #4. (5) Survey order probit is used for life satisfaction; survey linear
is used for mental health. All the estimations uses weights and allow error to
cluster at the county level.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Distribution of annual household income in BRFSS 2005-2009
Item Midpoint NumberPer cent
Less than $10,000 $7,954 63,625 4
Between $10,000 and $15,000 $12,828 66,513 4
Between $15,000 and $20,000 $17,534 93,129 6
Between $20,000 and $25,000 $23,102 115,946 7
Between $25,000 and $35,000 $30,718 155,076 10
Between $35,000 and $50,000 $42,767 207,710 13
Between $50,000 and $75,000 $67,718 240,541 15
Greater than $75,000 $125,362 445,086 28
Information is missing 179,524 11
Total 1,567,150 100
Notes: (1) The table shows statistics from the BRFSS sample used in estimations;
about 300,000 observations were omitted, mostly because those respondents did not
supply information on county of residence or because we do not have unemployment
statistics for their counties of residence. (2) Analytical weights are used. (3) The
midpoint is approximated under the assumption that household income follows a
lognormal distribution. The mean of that distribution is observed from the survey
itself (excluding those missing income information); the standard deviation is the
average of all imputed values based on individual cutoﬀ points (the cutoﬀ point is
discarded if it coincides with the mean).
48Table A.2: Distribution of monthly household income in Gallup Daily Poll 2008-2009
Monthly income Midpoint(annual)NumberPer cent
$500 to $999 $9,818 38,020 6
$1,000 to $1,999 $19,576 84,459 13
$2,000 to $2,999 $31,287 77,334 12
$3,000 to $3,999 $43,020 64,263 10
$4,000 to $4,999 $55,603 53,638 8
$5,000 to $7,499 $77,135 89,131 13
$7,500 to $9,999 $110,860 37,733 6
$10,000 and over $180,338 68,968 10
Information is missing 147,784 22
Total 661,330 100
Notes: (1) The table shows statistics from the Gallup Daily Poll’s sample used in our
estimations; about 20,000 observations were omitted, mostly because those
respondents did not supply information on county of residence or because we do not
have unemployment statistics for their counties of residence. (2) Analytical weights are
used. (3) The midpoint is approximated under the assumption that household income
follows a lognormal distribution. The mean of that distribution is observed from the
survey itself (excluding those missing income information); the standard deviation is
the average of all imputed values based on individual cutoﬀ points (the cutoﬀ point is
discarded if it coincides with the mean).
Table A.3: Summary statistics for other variables in
BRFSS 2005-2009
Variable MeanStd. Dev.Min.Max. N
UR: unemp. rate in county 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.32 1567150
LFS: Unemployed 0.06 0.24 0 1 1567150
LFS: Not in labor force 0.33 0.47 0 1 1567150
Male 0.49 0.5 0 1 1567150
Age 18 to 29 0.2 0.4 0 1 1567150
Age 30 to 49 0.38 0.48 0 1 1567150
Age 50 to 64 0.24 0.43 0 1 1567150
Age 65 or above 0.17 0.37 0 1 1567150
Edu: High sch. or below 0.38 0.49 0 1 1567150
Edu: Some post-secondary 0.27 0.44 0 1 1567150
Edu: University degree 0.35 0.48 0 1 1567150
Single/never married 0.19 0.39 0 1 1567150
Married/with partner 0.64 0.48 0 1 1567150
Divorced/seprt./widowed 0.17 0.38 0 1 1567150
Continued on next page...
49... table A.3 continued
Variable MeanStd. Dev.Min.Max. N
Race: White 0.70 0.46 0 1 1567150
Race: Black 0.1 0.3 0 1 1567150
Race: Hispanic 0.14 0.34 0 1 1567150
Race: Others 0.06 0.25 0 1 1567150
Notes: (1) The table shows statistics from the BRFSS sample used in our estimations;
about 300,000 observations were omitted, mostly because those respondents did not
supply information on county of residence or because we do not have unemployment
statistics for their counties of residence. (2) Analytical weights are used.
Table A.4: Summary statistics for other variables in
Gallup Daily Poll 2008-2009
Variable MeanStd. Dev.Min.Max. N
Proxy for u-index 0.11 0.31 0 1 649687
UR: unemp. rate in county 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.32 661330
Male 0.48 0.5 0 1 661330
Age 18 to 29 0.17 0.38 0 1 661330
Age 30 to 49 0.35 0.48 0 1 661330
Age 50 to 64 0.26 0.44 0 1 661330
Age 65 or above 0.19 0.39 0 1 661330
Edu: High sch. or below 0.47 0.5 0 1 661330
Edu: Some post-secondary 0.22 0.42 0 1 661330
Edu: University degree 0.3 0.46 0 1 661330
Single/never married 0.2 0.4 0 1 661330
Married/with partner 0.6 0.49 0 1 661330
Divorced/seprt./widowed 0.2 0.4 0 1 661330
Race: White 0.75 0.43 0 1 661330
Race: Black 0.09 0.29 0 1 661330
Race: Hispanic 0.11 0.31 0 1 661330
Race: Others 0.05 0.21 0 1 661330
Notes: (1) The table shows statistics from the Gallup Daily Poll’s sample used in our
estimations; about 20,000 observations were omitted, mostly because those
respondents did not supply information on county of residence or because we do not
have unemployment statistics for their counties of residence. (2) Analytical weights are
used.
50Data Sources
Data sources for unemployment insurance. The ratio of average weekly
beneﬁt to average weekly total wage is from the CLAIMS DATA RE-
PORT (Taxable and Reimbursable) in the Annual Program and Finan-
cial Data (ET Financial Handbook 394) available from the Employment
and Training Administration at the Department of Labor.12 The data be-
tween 2005 and 2008 are from the annual reports. We also backed out
the average weekly wage by dividing the average weekly beneﬁt amount
by the ratio. The annual report for 2009 has yet to be released as of
June 6th, 2010. The average replacement ratios are very stable within a
state over the period between 2005 and 2008. We assume the stability
extends to the 2009, and use the 2008 in place of the 2009 data. The max-
imum beneﬁt amount by states between 2005 and 2009 is from the annual
“Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws” at the same source
(URL: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/comparison2009.asp). The
maximum amount in a number of states is a range instead of a single
value; we use the upper limit.
B. Constructing the instrumental variable for
local unemployment rates
For the instrument approach, we compute a series of annual likely employ-
ment loss for each county as a faction of that county’s total employment.
The likely loss is calculated based on the county’s composition of employees
by industries, together with the state-wide employment loss by industries.
More speciﬁcally, the likely loss between quarter t   4 and quarter t for
12URL: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/ﬁnance.asp. The so-named ‘Reim-
bursable’ include public employees and non-for-proﬁt employees









On the right-hand side of the equation, the denominator is the total em-
ployment in the county. The numerator is the likely employment loss during
the four quarters from t-4 to t; it is the sum of likely employment losses
from all sectors in that county, with sectors denoted as x in subscripts. For
a speciﬁc sector in a speciﬁc county, the likely employment loss is the prod-
uct of two factors: one is the proportional employment loss of that sector,
approximated by diﬀerence in logs, in the entire the state that the county
belongs to; the other is the number of workers in the county who are work-
ing in that particular sector. We work on the “Supersectors” as deﬁned in
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wage (QCEW) program. These
sectors are construction, education and health services, ﬁnancial activi-
ties, information, leisure and hospitality, manufacturing, natural resources
and mining, other services, professional and business services, trade, trans-
portation, and utilities, and the unclassiﬁed. All data are from the QCEW
statistics available on line from the BLS.
A positive value of this LikelyEmpLossRatej;s;t indicates a negative
labor market shock to the county involved; it is calculated from industrial
composition of the county and state-wide events; we are reasonably conﬁ-
dent that it captures exogenous shocks to the county. We will use the series
of likely losses to predict the current levels of unemployment rates using a
ﬁxed-eﬀect panel regression. In order to remove anything that may be re-
52lated to local culture and others, we remove county-speciﬁc intercepts from
the predicted values. The ﬁtted value, net of county-speciﬁc intercepts, are
then used to replace the actual unemployment rates in Table 1.
The ﬁrst-stage estimates are shown in Table A.5. The ﬁxed-eﬀect panel
has counties on the spatial dimension and quarters on the time dimension.
The dependent variable is the level of unemployment rates. The explana-
tory variable include county-speciﬁc intercepts, the likely employment loss
rate in the past one year and the lagged values of these likely losses in an
interval of four quarters; four such lags are included. The sample period
is between 2005 and 2009; with four-year lags, however, the explanatory
variable goes back to 2001. Finally, we use all the available counties for
the panel regression, even if some of the counties are not included in the
second stage of the analysis.
53Table A.5: The ﬁrst stage of the instrumental variable approach: predicting
local unemployment rates using current and lagged likely employment losses
unempRate
Variables (1)













Notes: (1) the variables shown on the top row are dependent variables.
(2) The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. (3) *, **, and
*** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) Sample
period is between the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 to the second quarter of 2009.
(5) Within-eﬀect panel regressions. County-speciﬁc intercept is not
included in the ﬁtted value of unemployment rates that will be used in
the second stage.
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